法拉奇采访邓小平
作者: 法拉奇
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奥里恩娜·法拉琪访问 唐钦周译
时间：1980年8月21日、23日
问（法拉琪）：邓先生，您最近说过，中国正处于一个转折点，称得上是第二次革命；事实上，今天来到北京的访客，都切实的感觉到情况要变了，人们的衣着不那么单调了，标语再没有贴出来了，毛泽东的像悬挂得很少，连紫禁城门上的那一幅，我总共才看到三幅，这几幅毛像还会继续挂下去吗？
答（邓小平）：会的，肯定会永远挂在那里，你知道啦，过去在公众地方，毛主席的像挂的太多了；挂得这么多，一看来反不够庄重，所以我们把它们除下来。不过……请你听着，毛主席犯了错误，这是真的；但是，他也是中国共产党和中华人民共和国的始创人之一。要评价他的功过，我们认为他的过失是次要的；这是说，他对中国革命的贡献不能够抹杀，而中国人民将永远怀念他。
问：对了，大家都知道，现在把所有的过失都归咎于四人帮，但是这符合历史真相吗？我们一提到四人帮，就有人告诉我，许多中国人都竖起五个手指同时愤怒地回答说：“对！对！不过四个人！”
答：（他笑着）那我更有必要讲清楚毛主席的错误，和林彪、四人帮所犯下的罪行，在性质上的分别。我得提醒你，毛主席几乎把一生献给中国，并且在最危急的时候挽救了党和革命。换句话说，他作出很大的贡献，没有他，中国要花更长的时间在黑暗中摸索道路；我们下要忘记，是毛主席将马克思列宁毛义的原则和中国的实际情况结合越来的，毛主席不仅把这些原则开创性地应用到政治方面，而且还应用到哲学、艺术、文学、军事方面；是的，直到六十年代，说得准确一点，在五十年代后期之前，毛主席的某些原则十分正确，通过他这许多原则，我们得到胜利。然而，不幸得很，他在晚年犯了错误、特别是文化大革命时所犯的错误，给党、国家和人民带来了很大的灾难。
问：邓先生，让我弄清楚一点，您提到毛主席的原则，您是指为世所知的“毛泽东思想”吗？
答：是的，你知道啦，远在革命战争年代，党还设在延安的时候，我们就把毛泽东的想法和原则综合起来，叫它做“毛泽东思想”，我们，便把它当为党的指导思想；不过，毛泽东思想当然不是由毛泽东一个人独创出来的，尽管大部份的观念是他的，但是其他的革命元老亦为这个思想的形成和发展尽过力，只提几个名字吧：例如周恩来、刘少奇和朱德。
问：您不算自己吗？
答：我不提自己，但是，我自然也出过一份力量，否则，我怎能算是老干部、老革命家呢！（他笑了）不过，回到我刚才所说的，毛主席晚年违背了他自己所定下的好原则，不健康的思想开始反映在他的行动和工作态度上，最不健康的思想便是他的极左倾向；唔，或许是胜利冲昏了头脑吧，或者是他跟现实脱了节；你知道啦，由于他对革命有重大贡献，他在中国人民心中享有崇高的声誉，获得许多的赞美——太多了，使他没有把自己多年前定下来的好原则加以制度化——例如民主集中制和群众路线——这便是他的弱点之一，虽然其他的革命同志，包括我在内，都有责任。家长式的行为开始滋长，而党的生活和国家的生活都不正常了。
问：对了，邓先生，您既然说有过这些错误，但你认为，这些错误难道是一下子发生的吗？例如大跃进不就是个错误吗？
答：当然，我说过五十年代后期是一切错误的开端，指的便是大跃进；可是，单独埋怨毛主席，也不能算公允，我们这班老干部在其中也犯了不少错误，例如做事违背现实规律，以为加速了经济发展，实际上所用的方法完全漠视经济规律，不错，毛主席应该负主要责任，但是他又确是第一个明白错误、提议修改的人，而到了由于某些不利因素而不能彻底改正时，他作了自我批评，这是一九六二年的事。可是，我们又不能从中汲取教训，他着手发动了文化大革命。
问：他对文化大革命的真正要求是什么呢？
答：防止资本主义在中国复辟，是的，这是当时的用意，毛主席的用意。我的意思是说，不同于日后四人帮的那些用意。不过纵然有个好目的，关键在于这个用意，是从对中国实际情况判断错误而推论出来的，因此毛主席又错了；在选择攻击对象时他错了，他说对象应该是党内的走资派，因此，一大批革命元老受到攻击，波及所有阶层的干部。不只是在革命工作上有过彪炳战绩的人受到攻击，连那些具有丰富行政经验的人也不能幸免，其中包括刘少奇，很快就受到拘禁和开除党籍。结果最少有十分之一的干部给杀害了。毛主席在去世前一两年承认这个事实，他承认文革有两件事是错了：一是文革最少使十分之一的干部遭到杀害，一是文革导致了一次全面内战。
问：那么，当时真的发生内战了。
答：还能说不是吗？人民分裂成两派，互相杀戮，又因为老干部给打倒了，那些自称“造反派”的人便更形猖獗，像林彪和四人帮那一伙。啊，许多人在那场战斗中死了。
问：有多少呢？
答：很难估计，因为有种种不同的死因，况且中国又那样大。不过，请听着，这么多的人死去，就算不计当时发生的其他悲剧，单是死亡人数就足以说明文革的错误。现在回到你开头所提出的问题，以及我的区分，我可总结地说，毛主席的过错是政治性的过错，这样讲并不减低他所犯过失的严重性，更不能说是为这些错误有所辩护；可是，讲到政治过错是一回事，讲到林彪或者四人帮的罪行却是另外一回事。是的，毛主席的确纵容了林彪和四人帮，他们利用他的政治过错来篡夺权力，不过…………
问：这里有个要点，邓先生！事实上我明白您们新中国领导人现在的窘境，重塑或者消除毛泽东的神话，但又不能完全消灭它，要抛弃它却又要尽可能的抛得少些。换句话说：您们的窘境在于要定出可接受的过去和要否定的过去。不过，除非您们重写历史，烧毁所有图书馆，不然，您们怎么办呢？毛的妻子不是四人帮之首吗？毛本人不是选定林彪做继承人吗？他不是培植他作为他王位的继承人吗？那我又要请问一句，你说这是不是又是一个“错误”？
答：我说是错误，而且，和其他错误算在一起，唔，那更是错误。领袖选定继承人是封建的做法。不过，你也应当考虑到民主集中制已经不存在了，我们完全失去了防止这类事情发生的制度。
问：总的来说，中国共产党下次大会，就不会像苏联共产党二十届大会那样收场；不会像赫鲁晓夫打倒斯大林那样，对不对？
答：你说得没有错，我们一定会把毛主席一生的功过评得恰如其份，我们一定会肯定他的功劳，并指出他的功劳是主，虽承认他有过失，但那是次。公开对他评价时，我们会采取实事求是的态度。不过，我们一定会坚持毛泽东思想，这是他一生的正确部份。坚持毛泽东思想不光是把他的肖像挂在天安门广场，而是为了纪念领导我们取得胜利和创造国家的人，这绝不是渺小的事情；为此，中国人民永远拥戴他，以毛泽东思想为无价之宝。你一定这样记下来：我们不会像赫鲁晓夫在苏共二十次大会对待斯大林那样来对待毛泽东。
问：在党代表大会之外，还要审判林彪和四人帮……审判即将进行，对不对？
答：是的，我们准备之中，会在年底进行。
问：我这样问，是因为你宣布审判四人帮已经有三年了，为什么还没有进行呢？
答：我们将进行审判，我向你保证，我们将进行审判。为了作好准备，我们必须待些日子，他们的罪行不可胜数，现在我们是按社会主义法制来办事。
问：四人帮仍然活着，对吗？江青还活着，对吗？
答：她一样吃饭，大食得很，她睡觉，当然是睡在狱中，那她当然还活着，他们全都活着。
问：好，既然他们还活着，她活着便会讲话，他们也会讲话，并且会提到毛，他们会说到毛的许多事情；如果审判结束时，在道德上对毛有所谴责，那又怎样呢？我的意思是说，如果判词跟你为大会预设的对毛的辩护有所不同，哪又怎么样呢？
答：我可以向你保证，审判四人帮绝不会沾污人们对毛主席的怀念。当然，审判四人帮会证明他对某些事情应负责任，例如起用四人帮，但亦仅此而已。四人帮罪恶昭彰，根本不需要把毛主席拖下水，以证明四人帮的罪行。
问：我真感奇怪，邓先生，您一方面指责他，但另一方面又替他辩护，即使在谴责他的时候，您还是处处给他开脱，可是，在毛的授意之下你曾给罢官两次。
答：不，不只两次，是三次，但并没有得到毛主席的赞同的（他笑）。对，我死了三次，复活了三次。您知道王明这个名字吗？他在一九三二年领导中国共产党和其中的极左派小集团。唔，我第一次倒台是一九三二年，这要感谢王明，他指我支持毛泽东一伙来反对他，把我打倒了。我要等上三年，到了一九三五年，长征时召开了遵义会议，我才复出。王明等的极左机会主义者在遵义会议上给击败了，我得到重新任命，担任党总书记。第二次倒台，大家都知道，发生在文革开始时，当时我还是总书记，也是中央委员会常委，又是副总理，唔，这一回，毛主席也极力保住我，但没有成功、因为林彪和四人帮太憎恨我，虽然不像他们恨刘少奇那么深，可是已经足以把我下放到江西省劳动，到一九七二年，毛主席又召我回京。问：是毛还是周恩来？
答：是毛主席，有些人认为是周恩来把我召回的，这个我知道，不过，其实不是周恩来，而是毛主席。当时周恩来病重，由于政府差不多全是靠他一人，所以毛主席把我召回，派我回到政府里的岗位，担任副总理。他说我的功过比例，过失只占百分之三十，功劳达到百分之七十，他以三七之分给我复出。然而，他也病重了，无力接见政治局所有的成员，他只见到包围在他身旁的人，即是四人帮的一伙。至于第二次倒台，发生在一九七六年四月——周恩来逝世后三个月也是毛主席辞世前五个月，然后在十月，四人帮被捕了，我的第三次复出没有人会感到诧异的吧！
问：我倒感到惊异呢！三次啊！老邓！是什么秘诀死了三次，又复活三次呢？
答：（他笑了，十分高兴。）没有什么秘诀，在某一个时刻，他们认为我还可再供差使，便把我从坟墓里掘出来，就是这样。
问：可是，在清算当中，你可曾担心过遭杀害？
答：当然啦！整个文革时期，林彪和四人帮都想杀我，他们没有干出来，是因为毛主席保护了我，甚至在给送到江西省劳动时还保护着我，毛主席派人注意我的安全。外国朋友经常问我怎样可以熬过那些考验和折磨还能活下去，我通常回答说：“我这种人是不容易因挫折而沮丧的，我是乐观主义者，我又懂得什么是政治。”但是，这个答案并不真实，不完全正确。我能够活下来因为我的内心深处永远对毛主席有信心，我对他有信心，因为我知道他了解我。
问：可是我经常听说他不能容忍你，他经常埋怨你说：“他（邓）是聋的，他偏偏坐得老远，尽量离开我。”“他当我死了，从不征求我的意见。”“他不理会我的想法，他只按自己的方法办事。”
答：那倒是真的：但是，他不是光针对我才说这种话，他常常埋怨别人；别人不听他的话，办事没有请示他，或没有向他报告，他都不高兴。这个嘛，其他人倒没有那么严重，我却真是这样；我这样做是为了不喜欢他的家长式作风，他自恃为家长，做任何事，不管别人的意见多么正确，他永远不去了解，他永远听不进有异于己的意见；他做人行事真有封建的、不健康的作风；如果你不明白这一点，你就不会了解为什么会发生文化大革命。
问：我不明白的事情太多了，邓先生！先说说周恩来的情形，在文革期间，他是唯一没有给打倒的，您怎样解释呢？我们都知道他为人高尚，可是，这么多丑恶的事情在他眼前发生，他从没有尝试去阻止。例如拘捕刘少奇，就是可耻的事，你怎样去解释呢？
答：让我们先谈谈周恩来是怎样的人，他是用力甚勤永不埋怨人的人，我告诉你，请听着，过去有一段日子，他每天工作十二小时，甚至十六个小时。我在法国时就认识他，我把他当为自己的兄长，我们差不多在同一时间参加了革命。周恩来受到所有人的尊敬——朋友和敌人，人民和同志都尊敬他，这是他没有被清算，一直能担任总理的原因——这带给许多人以极大的幸运。因为他受到敬重，他能够运用自己的影响力，充当调解人，成为缓和冲击的软垫子。幸亏有周恩来，避免了许多损失，多亏他的努力，很多人挽回了生命。但是，在那个年头里，连他也发现到自己处境十分困难，他常常说，但愿有些话没有说过，但愿有些事从没有做过，即使别人都完全谅解他，他还是这样说。例如刘少奇给开除党籍受到监禁时，那个所谓刘少奇罪行的报告，竟是周恩来宣读出来的。
问：是周恩来宣读出来的！
答：是的，报告当然是别人执笔，然而是周恩来宣读的，他不得不这样做，他避不了。
问：真可怕！真可悲！真可恶！又一次证明革命不会改造人类。革命之后，革命以前同样恐怖的事情仍然会发生，我国有一句俗语说：“每样东西都变了，但也像从前一样保留了下来。”
答：这个……我只能这样回答：通过建立有效的新制度，也许我们能预防、或者说尝试去预防这些事情的发生。你知道啦，刚才我提到“封建”这个名辞，嗯，刚刚过去的那段时期，我们好些制度都带着封建主义的烙印：如个人崇拜，办事崇尚家长式作风，干部终身制。中国是一个有几千年封建历史的国家，你明白啦！正因为这样，我们的革命受到打击，缺乏社会主义民主和社会主义法制。目前，我们致力于纠正这些错误，最终要建立真正的社会主义民主、真正的社会主义法制，以及……请听着，要防止将来发生类似刘少奇所遭遇的事情，除此以外，没有其他办法了。
问：噢！照我看来，江青的事情也带封建色彩，因为没有人敢反对江青，是不是因为江青是毛的妻子？
答：是的，这是其中理由之一。
问：那么，毛是真的给她弄昏了，给她完全支配了？
答：请听着，我提到毛主席犯过错误，亦表示起用江青就是一个错误。她是万分、万分恶毒的女人，她这样的恶毒，无论你用任何恶毒的事情都不能说明她的恶毒。如果我以中国常用的分数制给她打分，我的答案是不可能，因为没有一个分数适用于江青，江青是零下一千分乘一千分。可是，毛主席竟让她夺权，纠合她的小集团，让她利用毛泽东的名义作她的旗帜，谋取她个人的利益；又让她利用无知少年做垫脚石建立她私人的政治基地……即使他跟她分居以后仍是如此；对啦！分居了，你知道毛主席和江青分居多年吧？可是，分居之后，毛主席也没有设法阻止江青利用他的名字。
问：所以要拘捕她，以及拘捕另外那三人，要等毛死后才能动手？
答：是的。
问：邓先生，谁策划拘捕行动呢？我的意思是，你当时并不在领导层，你在拘捕行动中扮演了甚么角色，或者在甚么阶段介入？
答：这是个集体决定，知道一定会得到群众支持。我们在一九七六年四月就看得很清楚。当时，反对四人帮的群众声讨大会召开了，他们抗议取消周恩来逝世纪念的聚会。在那段日子里，我不能做事，我给罢免了，并且失去了自由。不过，早在一九七四和一九七五年我回到政府的岗位，便跟四人帮发生了直接的冲突，我使尽了我的影响力，向人民公开这帮人的真面目。不过，我一定要说明，毛主席逝世前不久，他已确切表示反对四人帮；事实上，“四人帮”这个名辞是毛主席先用的，他也选定了华国锋做接班人，借以阻止江青和其他的同伙接班。这一切都大力促成拘捕四人帮的决定，作出这个决定是不容易的。
问：邓先生，那我要向您提出一个尴尬的问题，请您原谅我。如果事情一如你所说，那又为什么在一九七六年九月十八日华国锋总理在毛的葬礼上宣读悼词时说：“毛主席亲自发动和领导的无产阶级文化大革命，粉碎了刘少奇、林彪、邓小平的复辟阴谋，批判了他们篡夺的那一部份党和国家的领导权。”
答：（微笑着）你得明白，在那些日子里，他们还来不及总结经验，我的意思是说，他们没有充份时间作详细的考虑和审视面对的问题，认为最要紧的是高举毛主席的旗帜，以应付四人帮。而……不久之后，他们发现群众对这篇悼词非常不满——这不奇怪，因为那不是一篇考虑周详的悼词，……这个，让我们这样说吧：悼词所表达的是过分简单化的观念，而华国锋同志在拟定悼词内容时，受到一种想法所左右，即但求安定。但在一个月后决定拘捕四人帮，华国锋同志不就是参与的领导人之一吗？不过在此之前的某些事情，并不符合毛主席的意愿，那倒是真的。
问：例如？
答：例如毛主席纪念堂，这违背毛主席本人的意愿；在五十年代，毛主席就说过，中国所有领导同志死后都应该火葬，只保留骨灰，没有坆场和陵墓给他们；在斯大林逝世后，我们吸取了教训，才有这个提议，并且写在文件上，确定下来，毛主席首先签了字，其他高层干部也签了字，包括我在内。周恩来是火葬了，你知道啦！文件还在呢！
问：你这个意思是要把纪念堂拆掉吗？
答：纪念堂吗，我告诉你，我不喜欢随便改变事物，现在它在那里，把它拆掉是不适当的。建造纪念堂固然不适当，把它拆掉也不适当。如果我们拆掉纪念堂，很多人会伤心，也会招致许多谣言。对了，有很多人都在这个问题上费心思。但是我们没有拆除纪念堂的想法。
问：邓先生，您当然明白，为什么刚才我向您提出这个令人尴尬的问题，因为很多人认为您和华国锋之间意见很不一致，你们有歧见？
答：没有，没有歧见，目前的路线是各人同意才订定的；当然，在若干特殊问题上，我们不可能永远一致；不过，我们已恢复了集体领导制，所有重要问题都共同讨论，因此，所谓“权力斗争”的意想全属无稽，最少我认为没有意义。我对权力不感兴趣，我就快辞去副总理的职位，到了一九八五年，我只希望做个顾问；请听着，我今年七十六岁，到了一九八五年，我便八十一岁了，一个人到了这把大年纪，脑子便不再灵活，一旦老了，也更易倾向于保守，所以倒不如限制自己的角色，当个顾问算了。
问：照我看，这是对毛的尖锐批评，我的意思是说，他从未像你这样想过。
答：（笑）这也批评了我的一部份同志，他们真的不想我辞职，为了使他们不再闹意见，我作了所谓的妥协，我说：就等到我八十一岁时看看情况怎样才决定吧。不过，我仍然相信，我在那个年纪之前就退休，只当顾问，会有好处，这我都说过了。让老人掌权，一直到逝世那天，这一套已经受够了，让领导人终身任职这一套也受够了。文件上从来没有写明要老人掌权，领导人为终生职。然而，这个错误的惯例，仍然支配着我们的制度，成为我们的弱点之一、阻碍了青年人上来，阻碍了国家更换领导人。中国正需要年纪较轻的领导班子。是的，咱们这班老人开放头脑的时候到了，为了树立榜样，我们要给年纪较轻的人让位。
问：不过，邓先生，新中国没有你，很难想像，你在过去和现在都是这次改革的主脑人，虽然你只是个副总理……顺带问一句，为什么像你这样的人向来只是屈居次位，表面来说，为什么你老是副什么什么的？
答：（笑得更频了）正如你所见，处于次位并不妨碍我办事。不过，回到我刚才说的，我向你宣布，我将不是唯一辞职的人，与我同年的许多同事都会辞去政府职务，例如陈云，李先念，徐向前和其他人，而华国锋将不再同时兼任国务院总理和党主席，中委会已经决定推荐赵紫阳当总理。
问：那么，领导人的更替也涉及华国锋。
答：是的，他还不到六十岁，他五十九岁吧；事实上，即使是党中央委员会主席的职位也不是终身职的，我的意思是说，他不能够终生当主席，目前的制度不容许这样做，他可以再连任两届或三届的主席，只此而已，而且他能任多少届亦即将作出决定。
问：让我们谈谈中国向西方资本主义国家开放的问题，我是指中国为了实现四个现代化而实施的经济开放政策。这种政策要引进外国资本，这样一来是否会使私有财产扩大，从而促成小型资本主义的诞生？
答：我首先要指出一点，归根到底，我国当前的建设原则和毛主席所制订的并没有两样。在接受国际援助的同时，我们还是要自力更生。即是说，无论我们怎样向西方开放、无论我们怎样利用外国资本、无论私人投资占多少比例，对中国的整体经济而言，外资仍然只占很低的百分比，绝不会影响社会主义的生产资料公有制。外国商人在中国设厂，只扮演互补的、次要的角色。当然，这样做会同时引进资本主义的坏影响，我们也警觉到这个问题，但我认为情况并不那么严重，我们并不害怕。
问：你是说资本主义其实并不那么坏？
答：那要视乎你如何界定资本主义。无论怎样，资本主义总比封建主义好，而且，不能说资本主义社会里发展出来的事物都有资本主义的性质，举例说，技术、科学以至经济管理，都有一个个专门学科，对任何国家都有用，我们打算学习所有这些东西，为社会主义建设服务。
问：好多年前，你警觉到大跃进失败时，你承认人类要有个体利润刺激才会积极生产。我则认为，人类要有个人利润刺激才能继续生存。这是否意味着要重新检讨共产主义？
答：马克思说，社会主义是发展共产主义的第一阶段，而且是一个漫长的历史过程。在这个阶段，我们仍要采用“各尽所能，按劳分配”的原则。个人和国家的利益应当结合起来，这样才能激发群众的生产积极性，只要能够帮助我们发展生产力，摆脱贫穷落后的状态，西方资本主义对我国是有利的。所以我认为：我们从中得到的利益远比随之而来的不良效果来得大。
问：邓先生，你说过：“不论黑猫白猫，能抓耗子的就是好猫。”你会把这种实用主义，例如宽容，在政治生活中应用吗？我提出这个问题是因为想起你在美国说过，中国会消灭独裁，扩大民主，类似的讲法，你所指的是甚么样的民主？是否基于自由选举和多党制的民主？
答：我从未说过这样的话！从未说过！一定是误会了，不过，我可以告诉你，在粉碎四人帮后，我们十分强调促进社会主义民主，当然，我们不会放弃无产阶级专政，民主和无产阶级专政是矛盾的统一，我要补充说，无产阶级民主远比资产阶级民主优越，所以我们现时特别强调四项主要原则，这四项原则是：社会主义，无产阶级专政，马克思列宁主义及毛泽东思想、中国共产党的领导。这表示，无产阶级专政的原则并没有改变。
问：我现在明白为甚么天安门广场上，在毛泽东画像的对面，悬挂着马克思、恩格斯、列宁和斯大林的画像了！
答：在文化大革命前，这些画像只在重要节日才悬挂出来，这是我们一贯的做法，但在文化大革命时，这种做法改变了，当时他们决定长期悬挂这些画像，不过我们正准备恢复原来的做法。
问：原来是这样的，不过，无论是否在重要节日，你们一定要悬挂斯大林的画像吗？（61）
答：我们认为斯大林对革命的贡献大过他的错误。依我作惯用的评价方法，斯大林的功过是七三分，毛主席也经常这样说。在苏联共产党第二十次代表大会后，中国共产党对斯大林作出了非常清楚的评价，事实上，我们说过，会一直承认斯大林的著作是国际共产主义的经典著作。你大概也知道，我们也认识到斯大林对中国革命所犯的错误。第二次世界大战后，中国共产党和国民党发生内战，我们策动解放战争，斯大林反对我们，但即使这样，也没有改变我们对斯大林的评价。
问：那么，赫鲁晓夫又如何？
答：赫鲁晓夫？他干过甚么好事？
问：他批评了斯大林。
答：你认为这是他所干的好事吗？
问：实在好得很，我认为是天大的好事。斯大林所杀害的人，比在文化大革命期间丧生的人还要多！
答：这点我不能确定，完全不能确定，无论怎样，实在不能相提并论。
问：那么，你认为斯大林好过赫鲁晓夫？
答：我只能告诉你，我们绝不会以赫鲁晓夫对待斯大林的做法去对待毛主席！
问：如果我告诉你，在西方，人家称你为中国的赫鲁晓夫，你有甚么想法？
答：（大笑）听我说，在西方，他们喜欢叫我甚么都可以，但我非常了解赫鲁晓夫，我和他打了十年的交道，我可以告诉你，把我和赫鲁晓夫比较是无聊的。赫鲁晓夫对中国坏事做尽，斯大林则对中国做了一些好事。中华人民共和国建立后不久，斯大林衷诚地协助我们建立和改进工业体制，打下了中国经济的基础。当然，这种协助并不是免费的，我们要付出代价。但在赫鲁晓夫当权后，所有事情都改变了，他撕毁所有中苏签署的协定，所有在斯大林执政时签署的数以百计的合同。啊，谈起他使人感到十分讨厌！这样吧，你保留你的观点，我保留我的看法，我们不再谈赫鲁晓夫了。
问：邓先生，你是否认为国际共产主义运动发扬了国际主义？
答：可以这样说，但，同样重要的是没有一个国家的共产党以家长自居，没有共产党自认是共产主义运动的核心。没有所谓核心存在，也没有谁是大老板。苏联共产党不再是列宁所领导的共产党了，我们认为苏联是一个帝国主义国家。一个社会帝国主义国家；由于苏联共产党统治着一个帝国主义国家，究竟苏联共产党是否真正的共产党，很值得怀疑。
问：不错，我的意思是在今日的世界里，武装冲突只发生在共产国家阵营内，而在另一个阵营，除了阿拉伯国家外，一个国家对另一个国家仇视的程度，没有像共产国家阵营里敌意那么深。苏联和中国互相仇视，中国和越南也互相仇视。
答：你要讨论越南问题吗？那么听我说。从全球战略观点来判断，越南紧跟着苏联的步伐，正如我不断指出，越南已经成为东方的古巴，越南强占了老挝和柬埔寨，难道还不足以使我们反省，越南究竟是怎么样的国家？我们找不出半点理由可以解释越南为甚么会反过来对抗中国。在越南为民族独立从事长期斗争中，中国提供了不少援助，无私的援助。我们从来没有做过对不起越南的事情，也从来没有干涉越南的内政。在那些日子里，你知道我们向越南提供了多少援助？整整二百亿美元，对中国这个贫穷国家来说，是很重大的负担。
问：是的，但你们接着又在一场小规模战争中互相残杀。
答：对的，我们对越南发动了一场自卫还击战。不过，回顾事件的发展，不得不指出效果并不理想，许多国家不赞同我们的做法。我们已着意克制。然而，这次行动表现了我们敢于捋老虎须的决心，我们也保留了再次教训他们的权利。
问：这是当代的创伤之一。邓先生，我们曾为越战感到痛心，为反对越战而奋斗，现在，有人不禁要问：我们过去错了吗？
答：不，不！我们没有错，我们从未后悔站在越南的一方，援助越南是正确的，假使再有国家要对抗外国侵略，我们仍会加以支援。不过，今天越南的情况刚好反过来，我们不得不应付这种局势。
问：对，不过，邓先生，中国也会受到谴责的，你们怎么可以站在波尔布特的一方呢？
答：是这样的，我们必须认清事实。谁解放了柬埔寨？谁把美国人和朗诺政权驱逐出柬埔寨？难道不是由波尔布特所领导的柬埔寨共产党吗？西哈努克亲王没有军队，他被自己的人民推翻了，虽然这样，他开始流亡后，中国仍然继续支持他，并欢迎他在北京作客，但，在柬埔寨境内作战的并不是西哈努克，而是由波尔布特领导的人民军队。在几乎完全没有外援的情况下，波尔布特战胜了。你知道吗？中国运往柬埔寨的支援物资大部份给越南拦途截定了，中柬两国没有共同边界，因此支援物资一定要途经越南，而越南就利用这种机会上下其手，这些物资从未运抵柬埔寨。
问：但波尔布特……
答：我知道你想说甚么。没错，波尔布特和他的政府犯了严重错误，我们也知道这一点，我们当时已经了解这一点。回顾过去，也许我们有责任，没有向波尔布特指出他所犯的错误。我们对波尔布特也这样说。事实上，我们一贯的做法是避免对其他政党或国家的事务作出评论，因为我们不想别人误会中国干涉别国内政，无论怎样，今天的问题是：谁在对抗越南？西哈努克亲王完全没有军队，其他的几股势力，像宋双所领导的军队，规模太小，起不了甚么作用。真正与越南作战的是波尔布特军队，柬埔寨人民也追随波尔布特。
问：我不相信，邓先生，柬埔寨人民会追随波尔布特，波尔布特屠杀他们，以恐怖手段毁灭他们？怎么可能？你说波尔布特犯了错误，但灭种绝不能只说是错误，波尔布特这样做了，他杀掉了一百万人民。
问：你的数字完全不可靠，柬埔寨只有四五百万人，他杀掉了一百万？真是无稽之谈。你不相信柬埔寨人民追随波尔布特，我也不相信波尔布特杀掉了一百万人，他杀了一些人，而且数目不少，这是事实。他把城市居民赶往乡村，触怒了人民，这也是事实。但，仍是老问题，今天谁在战斗？谁得到群众拥护，谁的力量不断增长？反对波尔布特，或试图分化他们，只对越南有利。世界上总有一些人不尊重事实，为甚么不容许波尔布特纠正他的错误。
问：恐怕我也是不尊重事实的人，邓先生，波尔布特若是真的愿意纠正错误，要让我相信，那请他使所有被他杀掉的人复活过来。我还想补充一点：我明白你的现实主义，但，邓先生，你怎么和这种人混在一起？我并不单单是指波尔布特。法朗哥去世的时候，最先致送花圈的是中国，而且由周恩来具名。
答：是这样的，我们致送花圈的时候……请留心，想着的个是法朗哥，而是西班牙人民，我们希望改善中国政府和西班牙人民的关系，我们对某一个人的观点，并不影响我们的做法。对法朗哥的历史评价，我们并未改变，对日本天皇也是一样，我们仍然和日本维持友好关系，我们不能把过去的问题和目前的现实混为一谈。
问：皮诺切特（译按：当今的智利军事强人）并不是过去的问题，邓先生，他是当今的人物，阿根庭独裁者也不是过去的问题，他们是当今的人物，可是你仍然和皮诺切特与阿根庭的独裁者打交道，这还不过是其中一个例子吧了。
答：阿根庭的情况不同，这个国家日前由军人统治，我们的交往是以国家为对象，处理这种问题时，我们把人民和国家分成两个不同的层次，这是我们的原则。谈到智利，我知道许多进步朋友不了解我们对智利的态度，坦白地说，我可以告诉你，我们在那儿做了好事，让我再解释一下，阿兰第（译按，前智利总统）是中国的朋友，我们仍然怀念他，虽然他受苏联影响，我们仍然当他是朋友。事实上，周恩来总理曾忠告他：不要追随苏联，不要采取极左政策，否则会孤立自己。阿兰第遇刺后，智利的民主势力遭遇重大困难，我们研究过是否应该维持设在智利的大使馆，还是和智利中断关系。后来我们决定继续维持外交关系。在处理这种微妙和复杂的问题时，我们应该有远见，要作长远打算，并考虑整体利益。此外，还要非常谨慎和有耐性。上面所谈到的决定是毛主席和周恩来总理作出的。我虽然没有参与其事，但我认为他们的做法是对的。你是一位作家，也是一位记者，你可以对国际事务发表你的意见，作出你喜欢的选择。但，如果你是一个国家领导人，情况就不那么简单了。
问：你的解释使人信服，邓先生，现在我们可以讨论最后一个问题：关于第三次世界大战，或者，用你们的话说，“无可避免的第三次世界大战”。
答：因为超级大国的存在，因为这些超级大国所奉行的帝国主义的存在，战争无可避免；这不单是中国的看法，世界上许多人也认为战争会在八十年代爆发。未来十年非常非常危险，超级大国和帝国主义是可怕的，我们要牢记着这个事实，才会采取延迟战争爆发的措施和政策。但我所指的措施和政策并不是和平商谈或缓和策略。第二次世界大战后，西方国家不断谈和平，谈缓和，苏联也一样，但和平在那里？缓和又在那里呢？年复一年，日复一日，危险地区不断增加。第三次世界大战爆发的因素也随着增加。可是，那些人仍在高谈和平及缓和。
问：问题是大部份人不相信或者不愿意相信大战会爆发，这种情况在欧洲尤甚。
答：他们以为战争可以避免，其实在欺骗自己；他们闭上眼睛，卑躬屈膝，这种盲目、顺从、软弱的态度正是导致战争的因素。第二次世界大战前，“姑息”这个字眼人人都懂。因为当时张伯伦和达拉第七张对希拉拉采取姑息态度。今天，欧洲以及世界其他地区的许多国家，其做法就和张伯伦与达拉第在三十年代末期的做法一样，但他们的期望能实现么？他们的姑息态度阻止了战争还是促进了战争？新的姑息主义只会使西方和欧洲的力量愈来愈薄弱，苏联非常清楚这一点，因此竭力鼓吹缓和，眼看欧洲势力愈来愈薄弱，他们也就愈来愈嚣张。
问：你是否指舒密特和德斯坦没有察觉到这一点，因此与苏联玩缓和的游戏？
答：我是指有些人没有察觉到危险，我是指有些人所采取的方法并不聪明，我是指有些人心存侥幸，这是不明智的，举例说，中国在处理类似越南的问题时，就不会这样做。我们不单着眼于中国的利益，更重要的是着眼于全球的战略利益。
问：邓先生，依你看，今天最有可能点燃战火的危险地区在那里？
答：我认为第一是中东，其次是印支。不过危险地区多的是，到处都有。很难预测战争在那里爆发。但要说出谁会煽风点火却是非常容易的事情。你一定知道，多年来中国不断指出，世界上只有两个国家有能力发动战争；美国和苏联？但在第二次世界大战以后，特别是朝鲜战争和越南战争以后，美国军力大降，全面后撤，美国目前只采取守势，让我们面对这个事实：美国害怕苏联。这还不止，由于两国的政治制度不同，美国不容易作出决定。但苏联却采取攻势，可以很快地作出决定，只要召集几个政治局委员就成了。侵略阿富汗不就是政治局的几个委员所作出的决定吗？无论怎样，苏联的战略目标是欧洲，始终是欧洲，这个现实不会改变。
问：那么，你的意思是战争会在欧洲爆发？不，不一定在欧洲，而是为了欧洲，我是说战争会为了欧洲而爆发。因为欧洲具有最强大的政治影响力，也有军事力量，这都是称霸全球所必需的。即使苏联占领了中国，或占领了世界的其他地区，也不能建立全球霸权，要建立全球霸权，就一定要占领欧洲。不过，我断定苏联的战略目标是欧洲，但也包括中东和非洲北岸。总的来说，包括整个地中海区域。
问：波斯湾也是危险地区吗？
答：苏联入侵阿富汗，南进印度，是进攻欧洲，包围欧洲的战略！这和苏联在印支的战略是有关连的。苏联入侵阿富汗，明显地企图直达印度洋，控制中东，这个计划完成后，欧洲就会面临危机，因为苏联一旦控制了石油资源，欧洲还有什么办法呢？
英国前首相卡拉汉访问中国的时候，我和他讨论到这些事实。我对他说，若苏联取得中东石油资源的控制权，欧洲便会面临危急时刻，我向卡拉汉提出了这个问题：“卡拉汉先生，如果苏联南下印度洋一旦成功，控制了波斯湾和中东，你要怎样做？到时候你只有两个选择，一是向苏联屈膝，或者接受芬兰化，这是最体面的让步。二是奋起战斗。”卡拉汉回答说：“只有一个选择。”
他没有说那是一个选择，但我明白他的意思，因此我对他说：“那么，你最好是现在就作出选择，立刻作出选择。”因为现在作出选择，就意味将前线放在阿富汗和柬埔寨……你看，我又提到柬埔寨了，你明白我对柬埔寨和波尔布特的看法吗？事实上，我们一定要设法把苏联纠缠在这两个地方，努力拖它数年，如果成功，战争也就能够推迟。
答：然后……我们要看局势的变化，几年之后，情形可能会好一点，最重要的是以拖延争取时间。
问：那么伊朗呢？有人认为入侵阿富汗是入侵伊朗的奏，苏联迟早会入侵伊朗。
答：我肯定苏联不会满足于占领阿富汗，下一个目标可能就是伊朗，也可能是巴基斯坦，我们不能预测苏联会向那一个国家先下手，但我认为应该更注意伊朗。
问：美国人质事件，伊朗国内的动乱，霍梅尼和他的追随者的狂妄，伊朗过去十个月来所发生的事情，难道你不认为对苏联有利吗？
答：听着，我不全然了解伊朗国内发生了甚么事情，我只能说那是一个麻烦的地区。我们不要忘记苏联在那里有一定的影响力，颇大的影响力。事实上，我们仍然维持设在伊朗的大使馆，无论局势怎样变化，维持在德黑兰的中国大使馆总是好事，将来会十分有用，这是我们尽量和伊朗维持良好关系的原因。
问：美国也维持设在伊朗的大使馆。
答：美国在伊朗已经束手无策。我不单是谈伊朗，而是谈世界大战的不可避免性。我认为我们不能忽略大战爆发的危险，我认为大战迟早会爆发，持相反意见的人犯了严重错误。多年前，毛主席和周恩来总理就不断忠告外国友人！苏联每天都在谈限制战略武器的条约和协议，与此同时，他们又不断增加军备。苏联目前的原子弹和核军备数量，多得令人难以置信，至于常规武器也堆满仓库，这些东西不是粮食，不是鞋袜，不是衣物，他们迟早会使用。
问：你的谈话使我想起一个问题，邓先生，中国常说已经准备好和苏联作战，但你们怎么和这个军备充足的国家较量呢？
答：（笑着）听我说，中国是一个贫穷的国家，军备十分落后，但我们有自己的传统。长久以来，我们总结了打败拥有先进武器的敌人的经验，虽然我们的装备落后，仍然取得了胜利。我们的国土广阔，我们的人民学会了怎样打持久战，怎样以弱制强。任何人想侵略中国，一定要考虑这些问题，我相信苏联不会不知道。许多人预测苏联的第一个侵略目标是中国，有些朋友更向我们提供苏联在接近中国边境地区部署重兵的情报，我对他们说，这已经不是秘密。侵略中国是苏联的一个主要目标，即使苏联攻下北京或黄河以北地区，对我们来说，仍然只是战争的序幕，在中国，苏联的军事优势只不过是一种神话，你知道吗？阿富汗游击队仍然十分活跃，在中国，我们有足够的地方和人民去应付苏联的侵略。
问：我明白你所指的传统，邓先生，你是指动一动小指，和声细语地说：“进来吧，亲爱的，进来吧，尽量使自己感到舒适，等会你就知道有甚么事情发生，谁能再找到你呢？”
答：（大笑）听我说，其他方面，譬如经济学，我是门外汉，但对于军事，我是懂一点的。
问：问题的关键恐怕是没有太多时间战斗，邓先生，因为中苏大战一旦爆发，就意味世界大战的爆发，也就意味核子战争的爆发，到时候一切都完蛋了我只同意你一部份意见，如果苏联入侵中国，一定不会是地区性的战争，但正因为双方都拥有那么多的核子武器，第三次世界大战仍然会是常规战争，而不是核子战争。
问：有些美国人也持相同的意见，谈到美国人，请你告诉我，你宁愿和尼克逊打交道，还是认为卡特较易相处？还有，假使朗奴列根当选，中美关系就此结束吗？
答：这个……尼克逊为我们做了好事。卡特任内，中美关系有了一些进展，但问题是，我们仍不十分满意。我的意思是，我对我的美国之行感到满意，但双方关系只热一阵子就没有多大意义。两个国家的友谊必须在许多具体的交往中表现出来。你明白吗，我们对美国国家领导人对中国的态度非常关注，但很难捉摸他们将来对中国会采取甚么政策……。
至于你所提的问题的第二部份，假使朗奴列根当选会否影响中美关系，我不知道，不过，从他的言论看，我没有理由感到乐观。
问：谢谢你，邓先生，我的问题完了。邓先生，还有一个最后的问题，你对自己的评价怎样？
答：正如我告诉过你，我也犯错误，有时还是非常严重的错误，但我从没有恶毒的意图，我的动机总是善良的。所以，回顾我的一生，我找不到内疚的原因。因此，我对自己的评价是五五分，是的，五五分就对了。
来源：《华盛顿邮报》（The Washington Post）一九八零年八月三十一日和九月一日所载意大利女记者 Oriana Fallaci 访问邓小平记录
On August 21 and 23, 1980 Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci interviewed Deng Xiaoping in Beijing.
It was one of many such exchanges with political figures of such stature, and can be found in her collection Interviews with History and Conversations with Power. The exchange was translated by Shi Yanhua, the former interpreter of Mao Zedong. This edition has been lightly edited for romanization, spacing, and the like.
A shorter summarized version is also available from the Communist Party of China’s online encyclopedia. [1]
Fallaci: Mr. Deng — you once said, in an article you wrote for the Western press, that China is in the grips of a movement that could be called a second revolution. And, indeed, the traveler who arrives in Beijing today, the last days of summer 1980, experiences an almost physical sense of change: no uniforms, no slogans, no abundance of red. And the portraits of Mao Zedong can be counted on the fingers of one hand; up until now, I’ve seen only three, including the one at the entrance to the Forbidden City that looks onto the images of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. I’ll use this detail to ask you my first question: will those few portraits of Mao remain, or will they be taken down?
Deng: They will certainly remain. They will always remain, even the one in Tiananmen Square. In the past, there were too many portraits of Chairman Mao; there were so many that instead of being solemn they began to seem banal, even disrespectful, and so we took them down. But… look, Chairman Mao made mistakes, yes. Nonetheless, he was one of the principal founders of the Communist Party of China and the People’s Republic of China. Thus, when we look at his merits together with his mistakes, we think that his mistakes take second place, while his merits take first. And this means that the contribution he made to the Chinese revolution cannot be forgotten and that the Chinese people will always cherish his memory; they will always think of him as one of the founders of the party and of the republic.
Fallaci: Yes, it’s often remarked that today, all the blame is attributed to the Gang of Four: to Jiang Qing, Mao’s widow, and the other three who started the Cultural Revolution. But is that historical fact, Mr. Deng? Someone told me that many Chinese, when talking about the Gang of Four, raise five fingers and reply “Yes, yes — four!” in irritation.
Deng: [He smiles.] Well, it seems I must immediately and clearly explain to you the difference between Chairman Mao’s mistakes and the crimes perpetrated by Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. I should remind you that Chairman Mao dedicated most of his life to China, that he saved the party and the revolution in their most critical moments, that, in short, his contribution was so great that, without him, the Chinese people would have had a much harder time finding the right path out of the darkness. We also shouldn’t forget that it was Chairman Mao who combined the teachings of Marx and Lenin with the realities of Chinese history — that it was he who applied those principles, creatively, not only to politics but to philosophy, art, literature, and military strategy. Yes, before the 1960s — or, better, up until the late 1950s — some of Chairman Mao’s ideas were, for the most part, correct. Furthermore, many of his principles brought us victory and allowed us to gain power. Then, unfortunately, in the last few years of his life, he committed many grave errors — the Cultural Revolution, above all. And much disgrace was brought upon the party, the country, the people.
Fallaci: Would you permit me to tweak your answer a bit, Mr. Deng? When you say “Chairman Mao’s ideas,” are you referring to what is often defined as “Mao Zedong Thought”?
Deng: Yes. During the Revolutionary War, when the party was still in Yan’an, we gathered together all the ideas and principles advanced by Mao Zedong; we defined them as “Mao Zedong Thought”; and we decided that this thought would guide the party from that point forward. And that is precisely what happened. But, naturally, Mao Zedong Thought was not created only by Mao Zedong. What I mean is: even though most of the ideas are his, other old revolutionaries also contributed to the formation and the development of those concepts — Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, to name the most important among them.
Fallaci: And you don’t include yourself in that list?
Deng: I don’t count, but of course I also did my part. If I hadn’t, I wouldn’t be an old revolutionary; I wouldn’t be a veteran. [He laughs.] Then, I was telling you, in the last years of his life Chairman Mao contradicted himself and the good principles that he had established. And unhealthy ideas and incorrect reasoning began to emerge from his behavior and his actions. The most unhealthy idea of all was the idea of the Ultra-Left. Humph! Maybe the fact that he had removed every trace of prudence from his character, or maybe he had lost contact with reality. You know, because of everything he had done for the revolution, he enjoyed great prestige in this country, and as a result he received too much praise, too much flattery. He ended up ignoring even democratic centralism, which is to say, the collective direction that he had always preached. And this was one of his most fatal errors, even though other revolutionaries, in some way, had their share of the responsibility — myself included. And it was thus that the patriarchal method began to develop in him; the life of the Party and the life of the country lost any semblance of normality. As you see, we are still talking about his mistakes.
Fallaci: Yes. And if that’s the case, Mr. Deng, shouldn’t we acknowledge that the mistakes began to emerge much sooner — almost immediately — and that the Great Leap Forward was an error?
Deng: Of course — and when I chose the second part of the 1950s as the start of all the mistakes, I should have made it clear that I was talking about the Great Leap Forward. But, here too, we cannot attribute all the responsibility to Chairman Mao; even here, we veterans had our share of the blame; we acted against the laws of reality; and we claimed we could hasten economic development with methods that ignored all economic laws. So it is true that the person most responsible for this was Chairman Mao, but he was also the first to understand our error — to suggest ways to correct it. And in 1962, when other negative factors began to emerge and the proposals were not carried out, he admitted he was at fault. But even that wasn’t enough for us; even that didn’t teach us the lesson we should have learned. And so the Cultural Revolution occurred.
Fallaci: But what was the Cultural Revolution really trying to accomplish?
Deng: It wanted to avoid the restoration of capitalism in China. Yes — that was the intention. The intention of Chairman Mao, I mean to say, not the intention of the people who would later become the Gang of Four. However, despite the good intentions, such a goal was born of an erroneous judgment of Chinese reality. In short, once more Chairman Mao was wrong. He was also wrong when he chose what target to hit; he said that the target should be the followers of capitalism — the compagnons de route [roaders] of the capitalists who existed within the party — and with this accusation he attacked a great number of high-level veterans: men who not only had made excellent contributions to the revolution but had great experience. And among them was Premier Liu Shaoqi, who was arrested and expelled from the party. As a result, all of the revolutionary leadership was dissolved. A year or two before his death, Chairman Mao recognized this error. He said that the Cultural Revolution was wrong in two things: destroying the revolutionary leadership and provoking a wide-ranging civil war.
Fallaci: So it was truly a civil war.
Deng: Yes, it was! The people were divided into two factions who were killing each other. And since the old revolutionaries had been swept aside, only those who declared themselves “rebels” were able to emerge. Like Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. Eh! Many people died in that civil war.
Fallaci: How many?
Deng: An exact figure is impossible. It will never be possible, because they died for various reasons and because China is such a vast country. But look: enough died that we are able to say today that their deaths were reason enough for the Cultural Revolution to have never taken place. Anyway, Chairman Mao’s errors were political errors. This makes them no less serious, nor does it justify them, but political errors are one thing; crimes that are judged in court are another. I refer to the crimes for which we tried the Gang of Four and, posthumously, Lin Biao: the two groups of the Cultural Revolution that we consider counterrevolutionary. Of course… well, of course it was Chairman Mao who permitted Lin Biao and the Gang of Four to take advantage of his political errors and usurp power…
Fallaci: That’s the point, Mr. Deng. Because I understand that you, as the leader of a new China, are attempting to survive a terrible situation: rescaling and possibly erasing the myth of Mao without destroying it — throwing out everything while trying to throw out as little as possible. Ultimately, you are experiencing what some have defined as “the dilemma of choosing between accepting the past and disowning the past.” But, short of rewriting history and burning all the libraries, how will you choose? The director of the Gang of Four was Mao’s wife, and it was Mao himself who chose Lin Biao as heir to the emperor. Was this also a “mistake”?
Deng: I believe it was, and I would group it with the other errors I have already noted. Then… well, it’s obvious that the investiture of Lin Biao wasn’t right. It’s obvious that choosing your own successor like an heir to the throne is, from a leader’s perspective, a feudal practice. But we also need to be aware of the fact that democratic centralism no longer existed — that we no longer had a system for avoiding things of this nature.
Fallaci: To conclude this line of questioning: I can’t imagine that, at the next Congress of the Communist Party of China, we will see a repeat of the events of the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin. Or am I mistaken?
Deng: You are not mistaken. At the Congress we will objectively evaluate the merits and the mistakes that characterized the life of Chairman Mao; we will celebrate his merits and recognize that they are of primary importance; and we will admit his mistakes, recognizing that they are of secondary importance. By making public the mistakes that Chairman Mao committed in recent years, we will adopt a realistic attitude. But we will certainly continue to follow Mao Zedong Thought — or, rather, all that which constituted the just part of his life. And, no, it is not only his portrait that remains in Tiananmen Square but also the memory of the man who brought us to victory and who, in essence, founded a country. And this is no small feat. And I’ll repeat: the Communist Party of China and the people of China will always look to him like a symbol — a very precious treasure. Write this down: we will never do to Mao Zedong what Khrushchev did to Stalin at the twentieth Congress of the CPSU.
Fallaci: But, besides the Congress, there will also be a posthumous trial for Lin Biao and the Gang of Four and… there will be a trial, correct?
Deng: Certainly — we are preparing for it now. It should take place at the end of the year.
Fallaci: I only ask because you have been announcing these trials for at least three years, but they have yet to take place.
Deng: They will; I am telling you that they will. We needed all this time to prepare. The crimes that they are accused of are numerous! And by now the country is acting under a socialist legal system.
Fallaci: And the Gang of Four are alive, is that correct? Jiang Qing is alive, is that correct?
Deng: She eats — quite a bit — and sleeps. In prison, naturally. And from that you may deduce that she is alive.
Fallaci: Good. And since she is alive, she will speak. Since the other three are alive, they will speak. And they will invoke Mao’s name; they will say many things about Mao. So the trial could bring about a moral condemnation of Mao — in other words, a verdict that is very different from the a priori absolution that will come about at the Congress.
Deng: I assure you that the trial of the Gang of Four will not sully the memory of Chairman Mao in any way. Of course, it will show that he had some responsibility — for example, that he used the Gang of Four — but nothing more. The crimes that the Gang of Four will be convicted of are so evident that there will be no need to involve Chairman Mao to prove them.
Fallaci: I’m very surprised, Mr. Deng. With one hand, you accuse him; with the other, you defend him. But you defend him even when you accuse him; and you were deposed twice on Mao’s orders.
Deng: Not twice — three times. But I wouldn’t say that I was deposed with the approval of Chairman Mao. (He laughs). Yes, I had three deaths and three resurrections. Have you ever heard the name Wang Ming, the man who led the Communist Party of China in 1932, directing the faction of opportunists who defined themselves as the extreme left? Eh! My first fall occurred in ‘32, thanks to Wang Ming. He accused me of stirring up trouble for Mao Zedong’s group; he got rid of me; and it took three years for me to recover. But I did recover; in 1935, during the Long March, at the Zunyi Conference, when the opportunists on the extreme left were defeated, Wang Ming was cast aside, and Mao Zedong retook control of the party, making me secretary general. My second fall, as you know, happened at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, when I was secretary of the party and one of the directors of the Central Committee, not to mention vice-premier. And Mao tried to protect me this time too. He wasn’t successful, however; Lin Biao and the Gang of Four hated me too much. They didn’t hate me as much as they hated Liu Shaoqi, however, so I wasn’t arrested and left to die in prison; but they certainly hated me enough to send me to Jiangxi province to do hard labor. And in 1973, when Chairman Mao called me back to Beijing…
Fallaci: Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai?
Deng: Chairman Mao. I know, some believe that it was Premier Zhou Enlai. But it wasn’t Zhou Enlai; it was Chairman Mao. Zhou Enlai was already gravely ill at that time, and, since the government was resting almost exclusively on his shoulders, the damage that his illness was inflicting on the country was great. Chairman Mao called me back; he asked me to substitute Zhou in his day-to-day affairs; and he charged me with the office of vice-premier. He said that my case should be judged by a score of thirty to seventy; that is, thirty percent for my errors, seventy percent for my merits. And this shows you that even my second resurrection was due to Chairman Mao — even though, at that time, he was seriously ill himself. He couldn’t even meet with the officers of the Politburo; he only saw the members of the Gang of Four. As far as my third fall is concerned, it occurred in April of 1976 — three months after the death of Zhou Enlai and five months before the death of Chairman Mao. And since, the following October, the Band of Four was arrested, it’s no surprise that I rose again.
Fallaci: I’m surprised, however. Three times! Mr. Deng, how can a man fall and get back up again three times? Is there a secret?
Deng: [He laughs, happy.] There is not. I kept serving him again, and they kept throwing me out again. That’s all.
Fallaci: And were you never afraid that you would be killed during those purges?
Deng: Yes, I was afraid of being killed. During the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four always wanted to kill me. They didn’t because Chairman Mao stopped them. Look, even when I was sent to labor in Jiangxi province, Chairman Mao made sure that someone there was looking out for my safety. Eh! Foreign friends often ask me how I survived so many trials, so many tribulations, and I always reply, “Because I am an optimist, because I am never discouraged, and because I know that politics is a seesaw moving up and down.” But that answer is incomplete. The truth is that, through it all, I always believed in Chairman Mao. I believed because I was always sure that he knew me well.
Fallaci: I had always read that he couldn’t stand you — that he complained about you continually: “He’s deaf, but he always sits far away from me at meetings,” “He treats me like a dead ancestor; he never asks me anything,” “He never even tries to find out what I think; he always gets his own way.”
Deng: It’s true, it’s true, even though he didn’t say only those things about me. He complained about everything to everyone, always saying that he wasn’t being listened to, or consulted, or informed. But I truly did give him cause to complain, because I didn’t like the way he behaved — his way of acting like a great patriarch. He acted like a patriarch; he never wanted to hear anyone else’s ideas, even if they were good — never listened to opinions different from his own. He behaved in an unhealthy way, that’s what it was; he had a feudal way about him. If you don’t understand this, then you can’t understand how he was able to launch the Cultural Revolution.
Fallaci: I don’t understand many things, Mr. Deng. And the first involves Zhou Enlai. How do you explain that the one man who was not caught up in the Cultural Revolution was Zhou Enlai? How do you explain the fact that, even though he was a noble man, he never tried to check the infamy that was happening right under his nose; for example, the scandalous arrest of Liu Shaoqi?
Deng: Let me begin by telling you who Zhou Enlai was: he was a man who worked like a dog his whole life without ever complaining. Listen, there were days when he was working twelve or even sixteen hours. I can tell you this because I knew him well; we came into the Cultural Revolution at around the same time, Zhou Enlai and I, and when we were in France in the 1920s I thought of him as a big brother. Furthermore, he was respected by everyone who knew him — by his friends and his enemies, his comrades, and his people.
And this explains, at least partially, why Zhou Enlai was able to remain in his position as premier when everyone else was caught up in the Cultural Revolution; something that, it should be said, was a great good fortune for a great many people — a great advantage. Well, during the Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai always exercised a moderating influence; he acted as a cushion and shielded many people from violent blows. But for many years he found himself in a very difficult position — extremely difficult. And he often said things that he would have preferred not to say, he did things he would have preferred not to do, even though we all forgave him everything. He often acted against his own will, in short. When Liu Shaoqi was expelled from the party and imprisoned, the report of his so-called crimes was read by Zhou Enlai.
Fallaci: By Zhou Enlai?
Deng: Yes, by Zhou Enlai. Naturally, the report had been written by others, but Zhou Enlai read it. He couldn’t have done otherwise; he had to read it.
Fallaci: That’s remarkable — disappointing and remarkable. Because it shows, yet again, that revolutions do not change people and that after a revolution the proverb is still true: “The more things change, the more they stay the same.”
Deng: Hmm. I can only tell you that it is possible to prevent these things, or to attempt to prevent them, to establish a system that is truly new. A little while ago, I said the word “feudal.” There, some systems of our recent past were very similar indeed to feudalism. Indeed, they bore all the stigmata of feudalism: the cult of personality, the patriarchal way of running things, the lifelong terms for leaders. China has a history of feudalism that stretches back thousands of years, and, because of this, our revolution suffered greatly for the lack of democratic socialism, of socialist legal systems. Now we are trying to change — to truly reform the system — to finally establish a real socialist democracy and… listen, there’s no other way to avoid episodes like Liu Shaoqi.
Fallaci: Well, if you think about it, Jiang Qing’s story is a feudal story, as well. One of the reasons why no one dared to challenge her is that she was Mao’s wife, wouldn’t you say?
Deng: Eh, yes. One of the reasons, yes.
Fallaci: Was he really so blinded by her — dominated by her?
Deng: Look, when I tell you that Chairman Mao made many mistakes, I’m also alluding to the mistake called Jiang Qing. She was a very, very bad woman. So bad that any bad thing said about her is not bad enough, and if you asked me to give her a score, like we do here in China, I would tell you I can’t, because there is no ranking for Jiang Qing. She is a thousand times a thousand below zero. And yet Chairman Mao allowed her to take power, to form a faction, to use ignorant young people to construct a political base, to use the name of Mao Zedong like a banner for her own personal interests… even later, when they had been separated for years — yes, separated. Didn’t you know that Chairman Mao and his wife, Jiang Qing, lived apart? Well, even after their separation, Chairman Mao never intervened once — never even stopped her from using his name.
Fallaci: And in order to arrest her, to arrest the other three, you had to wait for his death. Mao wasn’t even buried a month. Mr. Deng, who organized this arrest? I mean to say, how much responsibility do you take for it, even if you were deprived of all authority?
Deng: The decision was a collective one, and we knew that we had the support of the people. This support was clearly seen on April 5 in Tiananmen Square, when the people’s exasperation took the form of a protest over the lack of ceremony to commemorate the death of Zhou Enlai. I couldn’t do much of anything at that time, given that I had no freedom, but I exercised my influence in 1974 and 1975, when I was still in the government. Without any pretext, I opposed myself to the Four, doing everything I could to expose them for what they were. But I have to say that, right before he died, Chairman Mao had some harsh things to say about them; it was he who defined them as the “Gang of Four” and he who chose Hua Guofeng, so that Jiang Qing and her accomplices would not become his successors. I think all these things contributed to the decision to arrest her. It was not an easy decision, you know. The Gang of Four was very strong after the death of Chairman Mao; they had even tried to overthrow the new government led by Hua Guofeng.
Fallaci: In that case, I need to ask you a somewhat delicate question, Mr. Deng. And I’d like to apologize; I know that we Westerners are unable to understand some Chinese subtleties. Here it is: At Mao’s funeral, September 18, 1976, why did Hua Guofeng say, “The great Cultural Revolution that Chairman Mao wanted and led, has triumphed over the plots of restoration designed by Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping, and has allowed for the power they usurped to be rightfully restored to the interior of the party and the state structure”?
Deng: [He smiles.] You know, in those days, people did not have a lot of time to tally up the last few years, to reflect accurately. The important thing was raising Mao Zedong’s flag and confronting the Gang of Four. Only after, when we realized that that speech was not appreciated by the people… well, I’d even say that it was not a very well-thought-out speech. Let’s say that it was a misguided speech, and that the words of comrade Hua Guofeng were intended to preserve stability. Remember, Hua Guofeng is one of the leaders who decided to arrest the Gang of Four only a month afterwards. And it goes without saying that, previously, some not-unpleasant things had happened for the Four, in direct contrast with Chairman Mao’s wishes.
Fallaci: For example?
Deng: The decision to build the mausoleum. In the 1950s Mao Zedong had said that, upon their deaths, all Chinese officials should be cremated and only their ashes preserved — no tombs, no mausoleums for them. The idea arose from lessons learned in the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death and was then confirmed in a written document that Chairman Mao signed first. Then the rest of us signed, myself included, and, indeed, Premier Zhou Enlai was cremated. The document still exists.
Fallaci: Are you telling me that the mausoleum will be torn down?
Deng: No, we have no such intention. It’s already there, and it doesn’t seem opportune to demolish it. If we did, many people would be offended, and there would be too much gossip over the matter. Yes, I know that there are some people who say that the mausoleum should be torn down. But, as far as this subject is concerned, I do not agree with those who would change things.
Fallaci: Mr. Deng, I’m sure you understand why I asked you that delicate question not too long ago; because many people think that there are conflicts between you and Premier Hua Guofeng. Are there?
Deng: No. The current line of policy has been taken up through unilateral agreement. Naturally, with some specific questions, agreement is not always easy. But now that collective leadership has been restored, we discuss all important problems in a group, so all this speculation about “power struggle” makes no sense at all, at least as far as I’m concerned. Power doesn’t interest me at all. Soon I’ll resign as vice-premier; in 1985, I plan to serve as a counselor and nothing more. And listen, I am sixty-six years old, and when a man passes fifty his brain no longer works like it once did. And then the elderly tend to be more conservative, so I think it’s best to limit our role to one of counsel.
Fallaci: That seems like a jab at Mao Zedong. I mean, he saw things quite differently.
Deng: [He laughs.] As do several of my peers. Indeed, they don’t want me to resign, to cut things short, and so we reached a compromise. I said, okay, let’s see what happens then, when I’m eighty-one years old. But I said this still thinking that it would be better for me to resign before I reach that age, even if it’s just to set a precedent. I’ve had enough with old men who continue to govern until they die; I’m sick of lifelong leaders. Nowhere is it written that old men must rule — that leaders should lead for life — and yet this tendency continues to dominate our system. And it is one of our weaknesses, because it impedes young people from moving up — it prevents the country from renewing its leadership. And China needs younger leaders. Yes, I believe the moment has come when the old put themselves out of the picture — when they spontaneously withdraw.
Fallaci: Of course, it’s difficult to imagine China today without you, seeing as how you are the brains behind this change, Mr. Deng. Even if you are only the vice-premier… speaking of which, will you relieve my curiosity on one point: how is it that a man such as yourself has always remained second-in-command, has always been the vice-somebody?
Deng: [He laughs even more.] Eh, eh! As you see, being in second place doesn’t prevent me from acting. But, coming back to the previous argument, I’ll tell you that I won’t be the only one to resign; many of my colleagues who are my age will, as well: Vice-Prime Minister Chen Yun, [2] for example, and Li Xiannian; Xu Xiangqian, for example, and others. And Hua Guofeng will no longer be premier and party chair at the same time. The Central Committee has decided to recommend comrade Zhao Ziyang.
Fallaci: So the question of new leadership also concerns Hua Guofeng.
Deng: Yes, even if he is not yet sixty — I believe that he’s fifty-nine — because not even the post he’ll retain, as chairman of the party, is a lifelong post. No, Hua Guofeng cannot stay chairman of the party for as long as he lives; it is not permitted under the new system. Hua Guofeng can remain for another two terms — at most, three — and then no more. We’re still deciding over the question of terms and the renewal of mandates.
Fallaci: New things are truly happening in China! And, speaking of new things, let’s talk a little about the opening to the capitalist West. This is largely an economic opening, necessary to realize the project of the Four Modernizations. Since this opening will introduce foreign capital into China, it’s reasonable to assume that this will allow for the spread of private property. But isn’t this just the dawn of a new capitalism, in miniature?
Deng: Let’s say that the principles that we are following as we rebuild this country are essentially the same that were formulated at the time of Chairman Mao: to concentrate on our strengths and to consider international assistance as a subsidiary factor and nothing more. In whatever measure we open ourselves to the world — in whatever way we use foreign capital or accept the assistance of private investments — this assistance will only constitute a small part of the Chinese economy. In other words, foreign capital — and even the fact that foreigners will build factories in China — will not influence, in any way, our system, which is a socialist system based upon public ownership of the means of production. Despite this, we are aware that the decadent influence of capital will inevitably develop in China. Well, I don’t think that’s such a terrible thing. I don’t think that it’s correct to be afraid of this.
Fallaci: Do you mean to say that capitalism isn’t so bad after all?
Deng: It depends on the way you look at it. In any case, it is better than feudalism. We cannot say that all of the things that have been developed in capitalist countries are of a capitalist nature. Technology, for example; science; the ways of managing the economy, which is another science in itself, do not bear a classist stigma. And we intend to learn these things from you in order to aid us in our construction of a socialist society.
Fallaci: And yet, at the end of the 1950s, I seem to recall, when you realized that the Great Leap Forward had been a failure, you recognized that man needs an incentive to produce; I would even argue that man needs an incentive to exist. Doesn’t that mean questioning the ideas of Communism itself?
Deng: According to Marx, socialism, which is the first stage of Communism, covers a very long period. And, during this period, we will try to fulfill the principle “From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.” In other words, we will blend the interests of the individual with the interests of the country. There is no other way to mobilize interest in production among the masses, let’s admit it. And since the capitalist West will be helping us to overcome the backwardness we find ourselves in — the poverty that afflicts us — it doesn’t seem opportune to get caught up in the subtleties. However things go, the positive effects will be greater than the negative effects.
Fallaci: “It doesn’t matter if the cat is black or gray, as long as it eats the mice,” you once said. Would you apply the same pragmatism, even the same tolerance, to political life? I ask you, thinking of an answer you gave during your visit to America: “In China we must eliminate dictatorship and broaden democracy.” What democracy were you referring to? The kind based upon free elections and a multi-party system?
Deng: I never said anything like that! That’s a misunderstanding. But I can tell you that, after having removed the Gang of Four, we strongly emphasized the necessity of promoting socialist democracy. Without losing, you understand, the dictatorship of the proletariat. Democracy and dictatorship of the proletariat are two parts of the same antithesis, and proletarian democracy is far superior to its capitalist counterpart. We are emphasizing the Four Principles that we must adhere to: the principle of socialism, the principle of dictatorship of the proletariat, the principle of Marxism and Leninism elaborated in Mao Zedong Thought, and the principle of leaders supported by the Communist Party of China. So, you see, that even the principle of dictatorship of the proletariat has remained untouched and untouchable.
Fallaci: Is this why, in Tiananmen Square, directly across from the portrait of Mao which guards the entrance to the Forbidden City, the portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin are still hanging?
Deng: Well, before the Cultural Revolution those portraits were only displayed during important occasions. This was the practice. But during the Cultural Revolution it was decided that they should always be on display, and that is why they are still there. Regardless, we intend to return to the old practice.
Fallaci: Important occasions or not, do you really need to keep the portrait of Stalin?
Deng: We think that Stalin’s contribution to the revolution is much more important than the mistakes he made. To use the Chinese way, the score for Stalin would be thirty percent to seventy percent: thirty for his errors and seventy for his merits. Furthermore, Chairman Mao agreed with me on the question of Stalin’s score, and, after the twentieth Congress of the CPSU, members of the Communist Party of China expressed a very clear judgment of Stalin. We said that we would always continue to consider his writings as classic works of the international Communist movement. You know, Stalin made mistakes even where the Chinese revolution was concerned; for example, after World War II he didn’t want us to sever ties with the Kuomintang or to begin the war of liberation. But even this does not cloud our judgment of him.
Fallaci: And Khrushchev?
Deng: Khrushchev? What good has Khrushchev ever done?
Fallaci: He denounced Stalin.
Deng: And you see that as a good thing?
Fallaci: Not good — great. For God’s sake, Stalin killed more people than the Cultural Revolution ever did.
Deng: I’m not at all sure of that. Not at all. And, anyway, the two things cannot be compared.
Fallaci: In short, anyway, you prefer Stalin to Khrushchev.
Deng: I just told you that the Chinese people would never do to Chairman Mao what Khrushchev did to Stalin!
Fallaci: What if I told you that in the West they call you the Chinese Khrushchev?
Deng: [He laughs.] Listen, they can call me anything they like in the West, but I know Khrushchev well; I dealt with him personally for ten years, and I can assure you that comparing me to Khrushchev is insulting.
Khrushchev only ever brought pain to the Chinese people. Stalin, on the other hand, did some good for us. After the founding of the People’s Republic, he helped us to build up an industrial complex that is still the foundation of the Chinese economy. He didn’t help us for free — fine, we had to pay him — but he helped us. And, when Khrushchev came to power, everything changed. Khrushchev broke all the agreements between China and the Soviet Union, all the contracts that had been signed under Stalin — hundreds of contracts. Oh, this conversation is impossible. Our backgrounds are too different. Let’s say this: you keep your point of view, I’ll keep mine, and we won’t say anything more about Khrushchev.
Fallaci: Fine, in that case we’ll talk about Eurocommunism and Berlinguer. Mr. Deng, I know that in the past you have been very skeptical about Eurocommunism and Italian Communists. You once said, for example, that any participation by Italian Communists in government would only favor the Soviet Union. Do you still believe that this is the case, after Berlinguer’s visit to China?
Deng: We’ve changed our minds about Italian Communists, and we’ve done so in keeping with Mao Zedong Thought, which states: “In every country the Communist party must combine the principles of Marxism and Leninism with the practical conditions in which they find themselves; there is no other way to find the correct path.” In other words, we don’t think that any Communist party should copy the revolutionary experience of another, even if the other in question experienced the Chinese Revolution or the October Revolution. To answer your question more precisely, I will tell you this: comrade Berlinguer asked me the same thing during his visit. And I told him that it was up to the Italian Communist Party to judge based on their own experiences.
Fallaci: I interviewed Berlinguer a little more than a month ago, and I told him that, in my opinion, Italian Communists and all European Communists more generally had not yet been able to cut the umbilical cord to Moscow. Would you agree?
Deng: Look, the reasons we reestablished relations with the Italian Communist Party is that the ICP has its own, independent thought. But this does not mean that we approve of all of the opinions held by Italian Communists. We don’t even claim that they approve of ours, please understand, but… well, let’s say that in the past the Italian Communist Party had a misinformed view of the Communist Party of China, and vice versa.
Fallaci: That doesn’t seem like such a big deal. And I think I can deduce that the mutual disagreement about the ICP’s relations with the Soviet Union have remained unresolved. In fact, there was no joint address, as many thought there would be. In your view, what is preventing the Italian Communists from detaching themselves definitively from the Soviet Union?
Deng: It is partly due to historical reasons and partly… look, it’s not proper for me to hazard guesses or judgments about other people; I can only comment on specific arguments. For example, if you ask me about Afghanistan, I’ll tell you it’s very comforting that Italian Communists condemned the invasion of Afghanistan, and it is completely deplorable that French Communists attempted to justify it. But, you know, European Communist parties are very different from one another. In fact, we have reestablished relations with the Italian Communists, and the same is not at all true for the French Communists. And I see no interest, on their part, in rebuilding a relationship.
Fallaci: What about Santiago Carrillo? Or Alvaro Cunhal?
Deng: Spanish Communists have proposed the reestablishment of relations, but, for the moment, we have not gotten beyond initial contacts. We are waiting to see if they develop into something or not. We have no direct relationship with the Portuguese Communists — none.
Fallaci: Well, you certainly can’t say that the international Communist movement is alive with internationalism.
Deng: You know, it’s a good thing that no Communist party feels itself to be patriarchally at the center of the movement — that there’s no center, no boss. At the outset, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union filled that role, but it is no longer the party led by Lenin. It is no accident that we regard the Soviet Union as an imperialist country and… yes, imperialist — socialist-imperialist. And since the country led by that party has become an imperialist country, it’s questionable if that party can still be considered a Communist party.
Fallaci: Yes, I wasn’t really alluding to that so much as the fact that today, in the world, the only armed conflicts are between Communist countries. For Christ’s sake! — leaving the Arabs to one side, on the other side there is no one country that hates another country with the same irreducible fervor that Communist countries seem to feel for each other. The Soviet Union against China, and vice versa; China against Vietnam, and vice versa; Vietnam against Cambodia, and vice versa… I said the same thing to Berlinguer.
Deng: Do you want to talk about the Vietnamese? Look, from a globally strategic point of view, the Vietnamese are merely following in the Soviet Union’s footsteps. As I always say, they’ve become the Cuba of the East. Isn’t it proof enough that they’ve occupied Laos and Cambodia? What else do you need to see before you ask, “What the hell kind of country is this?” We Chinese are completely unable to understand why they’ve opposed themselves to us. During their struggle for independence, we helped them greatly. We never abandoned them — never. Nor did we interfere with their internal affairs. Do you even know the kind of help we gave them over the years? The aid we sent is, comprehensively, about $20 billion. And we never asked anything in return. I’ll say this: $20 billion is a lot of money for a poor country like China.
Fallaci: But then you killed each other in a conflict that amounted to a small war.
Deng: Yes, it’s true that we launched a defensive counterattack against them. But, judging by the results, I don’t think that it was very effective. We were too contained; we saw that many countries were against this action, and as a result we were too contained. But the episode proved how determined we are to chastise the tiger. And we reserve the right to chastise the tiger again.
Fallaci: It’s one of the traumas of our time, Mr. Deng, because we all weep for Vietnam; we all fought against the war in Vietnam. And today some of us are asking, were we making a mistake; were we wrong?
Deng: No! No, no, we were not making a mistake; we were not wrong. We Chinese do not regret taking their side. It was right to help them, and we will do so every time that a people fights against a foreign invasion. But today in Vietnam the situation is reversed, and we need to confront that situation.
Fallaci: Yes, but even the Chinese are wrong sometimes, Mr. Deng. How can you possibly take the side of Pol Pot?
Deng: Listen, we look truth in the face — right in the face. Who liberated Cambodia? Who got rid of the Americans and the American-supported regime of Lon Nol? Was it, perhaps, democratic Cambodia — the Cambodian Communist Party, led by Pol Pot? At the time, Prince Sihanouk had no power; he had been deposed by his own people. We continued to support him regardless, and we accommodated his exile government in Beijing. But Sihanouk was not fighting in Cambodia; the Cambodian Communist Party was. They won, almost with no outside help. And do you know why they had no help? Because almost all the aid sent by China was confiscated in Vietnam. China shares no borders with Cambodia, so, in order to help them, we had to send our aid through Vietnam, and they took everything. Nothing ever reached Cambodia — nothing.
Fallaci: But Pol Pot…
Deng: Yes, I know what you want to say. It’s true that Pol Pot and his government made very serious mistakes. We are not ignorant of this. We were not ignorant of it at the time, and, looking back, I can admit that we may have been wrong not to talk to him about it. We’ve said as much to Pol Pot. The fact is that our policy has always been not to comment on the affairs of other parties or of other countries. China is a big country, and we do not want it to seem that we are imposing ourselves. Anyhow, today the reality we have to face has changed: who is fighting the Vietnamese? Sihanouk still has no power; groups like Son Sann are too weak; and the only ones who are able to conduct an effective resistance against the Vietnamese are the Communists who follow Pol Pot. And the Cambodian people are following them.
Fallaci: I don’t believe it, Mr. Deng. How is it possible that the Cambodians are following the same people who massacred them, dismembered them, destroyed them with blood and terror? You are talking about mistakes, Mr. Deng. But genocide is not a mistake, and genocide is what Pol Pot has done. A million people have been eliminated by Pol Pot.
Deng: The figure you name is not at all certain. You don’t believe that the Cambodian people are following Pol Pot, and I don’t believe that Pol Pot has killed a million people. One million out of four or five million? That’s nonsense — crazy. Yes, he killed many people, but let’s not exaggerate. He also had the bad policy of removing people from the cities, but let’s not exaggerate. And I tell you that he has the support of the people, and his power grows more every day. And I tell you that opposing Pol Pot — trying to overthrow him — only helps the Vietnamese. Eh! There are people in this world who live outside of reality, who won’t give someone who has made an error the chance to mend his ways.
Fallaci: Then I’m afraid I’m one of those people who live outside of reality, Mr. Deng. In order to convince us that he truly wanted to mend his ways, Pol Pot would have to resuscitate all the people he slaughtered. And, from outside reality, I will allow myself to ask you another difficult question: I understand your realism, but how are you able to have relations with certain people? Because Pol Pot is by no means the only one. When Generalissimo Franco died, the first flowers to reach his coffin were sent by the Chinese and bore the signature of Zhou Enlai.
Deng: Look, the flowers we sent to Franco’s funeral — they were meant for the Spanish people and intended to improve our relations with the Spanish government. The opinions that we have about individuals should not influence our actions, and, as far as Franco is concerned, I assure you that our opinion of him has not changed. Nor has our opinion of the emperor of Japan, and yet we have good relations with Japan. The fact is that we cannot project the problems of the past onto the realities of the present.
Fallaci: Pinochet is not the past; he is the present. Argentinean dictators are present, not past. And yet you have relations with them, with Pinochet.
Deng: The case of Argentina is different: Argentina is under a military government, and we deal with Argentina as a country; our policies serve the interests of China with that country. As far as Pinochet is concerned, I know that many of our progressive friends will not understand our behavior toward him, but, speaking candidly, I can tell you that our presence in Chile has done some good. And I’ll explain what I mean. Allende was a friend to China, and his memory is very dear to us. He was a friend, even if he let himself be too heavily influenced by the Soviet Union. On this count, Zhou Enlai gave him a very sincere piece of advice: don’t follow the Soviets in everything they say; do not adopt a far-left politics, or otherwise you will end up isolated. And, well, after Allende was killed and the democratic forces in that country found themselves in the extreme difficulty that we’ve all heard about, we thought long and hard about the appropriateness of retaining diplomatic representation in Chile, or breaking all ties. But we chose to stay. You know, when judging certain situations it’s important to keep an open mind and to examine the far-reaching criteria of each situation. It’s also necessary to consider global interests; in short, to be very cautious, very prudent. And, even if the choices you are referring to were made by Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai, and not by me, I maintain that they were correct. Listen carefully: you are a journalist, a writer, and you can say whatever you like about international affairs. You can choose freely. But when one is leading a country… it’s another story entirely.
Fallaci: This is a convincing answer, Mr. Deng. And at this point I’d like to undertake the last subject I came to interview you about: world war — or, rather, what the Chinese call “the inevitability of world war.”
Deng: War is inevitable because superpowers exists and because imperialism exists. And we are not the only ones who think this way; in every part of the world today, many people are convinced that war will break out in the 1980s. The next ten years will be very, very dangerous. They’re terrifying. We should never forget this, because this is the only way we will prevent war from breaking out immediately; this is the only way we can defer it. Not by chatting about peace and detente. Westerners have been talking about peace and detente since the end of the Second World War. So has the Soviet Union. But where is this peace, where is this detente? Year to year, if not day to day, the hot spots are growing; the factors that will lead to World War Three are increasing; and still they talk about detente and peace.
Fallaci: The fact is that most people don’t understand this — don’t want to understand this. Or they don’t believe it, or don’t want to believe it. Especially in Europe.
Deng: They delude themselves that war can be prevented. And so they close their eyes; they cover their ears. This is one of the factors that brings about war: this blindness, this subservience, this compliance. Before the Second World War, all of this became famous under one word: appeasement. Chamberlain and Daladier used this word to explain their passive attitude toward Hitler as he ravaged Eastern Europe. Today, certain European countries — and not only European countries — behave exactly as Chamberlain and Daladier behaved in the late 1930s. But what did Chamberlain and Daladier get out of it? What was their appeasement good for? World War Two broke out precisely because they underestimated the danger, because certain European leaders deluded themselves that they could avoid war by reacting passively and making concessions to Hitler. This new appeasement only serves to weaken the West — and Europe. The Soviets know this well, and so they encourage it. And every day they become more arrogant.
Fallaci: Do you mean to say that Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing are playing a game with the Soviet Union?
Deng: I mean to say that certain people are not aware of the danger. I mean to say that the methods adopted by certain people are not wise. I mean to say that certain people are rolling the dice, tempting fate, and that this is not wise. We Chinese do not behave in this manner. When we face a problem like Vietnam, we do so in the interests of everyone, according to the rules of global strategy.
Fallaci: Mr. Deng — what, in your opinion, are the hot spots today that could trigger war?
Deng: I would indicate the Middle East and then Indochina. But dangerous zones are everywhere at this point, and it is not easy to determine where the fuse will be lit. It is easy, on the other hand, to determine who will light the fuse. You see, the Chinese have said for years that only two countries are capable of launching World War Three: the United States and the Soviet Union. However, after World War Two — or, rather, after the Korean War and the Vietnam War — American power has been steadily declining, and the United States have continued to withdraw. Today, they are on the defensive, and let’s admit it: the United States are afraid of the Soviet Union. As if this weren’t enough, they are operating under a political system that does not allow them to make immediate decisions. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is on the offensive and only has to convene a few members of the Politburo in order to arrive at a decision. This is how it happened with Afghanistan; a few members of the Politburo met and decided to invade. Anyway, look: the focal point of Soviet strategy is Europe — is still Europe. And this reality will not change.
Fallaci: So war could break out in Europe? Is that what you’re saying?
Deng: No, not necessarily in Europe — for Europe. I’m saying that World War Three will break out for Europe, because Europe has the strong economy, Europe has political influence, Europe has military might, and all of this is needed for world domination. Even if they occupy China — even if they occupy the rest of the planet — the Soviets will be unable to establish the global hegemony they desire if they don’t have Europe. But, naturally, when I assert that the focal point of Soviet strategy is Europe, I include the Middle East, the northern coast of Africa, and the Mediterranean, essentially.
Fallaci: You didn’t list the Persian Gulf among the dangerous areas.
Deng: But that too, as well as the invasion of Afghanistan, or the march of the Soviets toward the Indian Ocean — it’s all part of their strategy to surround Europe in a pincer movement! Of course, the invasion of Afghanistan is the first step toward reaching the Indian Ocean so that they can gain complete control of the Middle East! And when this plan is completed, Europe will find itself in a critical moment, because what can Europe do, once the Soviets have taken the oil wells of the Middle East? When former Prime Minister Callaghan came to China, I discussed these facts at length with him. I told him that Europe’s critical moment would be reached when the Soviets gained control of the oil wells in the Middle East, and I asked him a direct question: “What will you do when the Soviet march toward the Indian Ocean reaches the Persian Gulf and the Middle East? Because at that point you will have only two choices, Mr. Prime Minister: either you fall to your knees before the Soviet Union and, at best, become a kind of Finland, which would be the most honorable solution, or you could fight.” And Callaghan said, “There would only be one choice.” He didn’t tell me which choice, but I understood him, and I replied, “Then you should make that choice immediately, Mr. Prime Minister. You shouldn’t wait.” Listen carefully: choosing now means stopping the front in Afghanistan and Cambodia and… do you see now what I was saying about Cambodia? If it were possible to stop the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and in Cambodia, World War Three would be deferred.
Fallaci: And then? If World War Three is inevitable, deferral seems almost pointless.
Deng: Then… we’ll see. In a few years, things might even improve. The important thing is to postpone the war — to gain a few years.
Fallaci: And Iran? There are those who say that Afghanistan is a sort of rehearsal for the eventual invasion of Iran.
Deng: I am sure that the Soviet Union will not stop in Afghanistan if we do not stop them. And it’s next target will be either Iran or Pakistan. And, even if it’s not possible to know which of these two countries they will choose first, I think it’s important to concentrate our attention on Iran.
Fallaci: But don’t you think that the drama of the American hostages, the chaos in which Iran is drowning, the madness of Khomeini and his followers — in short, what has happened in that country over the last ten months — is an advantage for the Soviets?
Deng: Listen, I don’t understand what is happening down there very well. I can tell you only that Iran is not just a hot spot; it’s boiling. Let’s not forget that the Soviet Union has a very strong influence in Iran. Eh! — very strong. And this should show you why we have every intention of maintaining the best possible relations with Iran. Whatever happens in Iran, you will see that a Chinese embassy in Tehran will be very useful.
Fallaci: It wasn’t very useful to the Americans.
Deng: The Americans are completely incapable of doing anything in Iran. But the heart of the matter, as I see it, is not Iran; it is war — the inevitability of war. I am not talking about Iran; I am asserting that war will break out, sooner or later. And whoever thinks differently is making a tragic mistake, because they are failing to enact effective measures. But really! — the Soviet Union talks about the SALT agreements incessantly, and yet it never stops arming itself. Its collection of atomic bombs and nuclear weapons is incredible, and its armories are filling up with conventional weapons. These weapons are not food; they are not shoes; they are not clothes; they are not things that will spoil if not consumed immediately. Sooner or later, they will be used.
Fallaci: Will you allow me an observation on this point, Mr. Deng? The Chinese always say that they are not afraid of the Soviet Union, that you are ready to face them. But how can you believe that you can compete with the tremendous efficiency of the Soviet military machine?
Deng: [He laughs.] Eh! China is poor and our military is backwards, I agree. But we have our traditions, you know. And for quite some time, using inadequate and miserable equipment, we have cultivated the art of defeating well-armed enemies. Our territory is extremely vast, and in this vast territory the people have learned the necessary resistance for a long war — to bend the strength of others through their weaknesses. Whoever wants to invade China should remember this truth, and I believe that the Soviets remember it well. Many people continue to predict that the Soviet Union’s next target will be China, and some friends even pass us information to prove to us that the Soviets are amassing troops along the Chinese borders and border regions. But we simply say that this has never been a secret, and that invading China is a very big step for them. Even if they were able to occupy Beijing and all the lands to the north of the Yellow Sea, for us the war would be just beginning. No, there’s no need to mythologize Soviet military superiority when you talk about China. The Afghan guerrillas are very active in Afghanistan, you know. And in China we have a lot of space — I repeat, a lot of people.
Fallaci: I think I understand the tradition you’re alluding to, Mr. Deng — the one that consists in beckoning your enemy in and saying sweetly, “Come in, my dears, come in. Make yourselves comfortable. Then you’ll see what happens. Who will ever see you again?”
Deng: [He laughs loudly.] Look, I don’t know about a lot of things. I don’t know much about the economy. But I know about war. I know how war is fought.
Fallaci: The fact is that probably no one will have time to fight, Mr. Deng, because war with China means world war; world war means nuclear war; and nuclear war means the end of the world.
Deng: I agree with the first part of your statement; if the USSR invades, it will not be a local war. I do not agree with the second part of your statement, however; it’s not certain that World War Three will be a nuclear war. In my opinion, this is because both sides have nuclear weapons, and there is a strong possibility that World War Three will be fought with conventional warfare.
Fallaci: Thank you, Mr. Deng. I’ve finished, Mr. Deng.
Deng: Thank you, and please make sure everyone understands what I’ve told you. Explain to them that it is necessary to carry out an objective evaluation of Chairman Mao — to first consider his merits, and then his mistakes. Explain to them that we will continue to follow Mao Zedong Thought but that we will be clear about where he was wrong. And explain to them that these mistakes were our mistakes, too — my mistakes, too!
Fallaci: I will, Mr. Deng. And if you’ll allow me one last question: What score would you give yourself?
Deng: Hmm… listen, I have made mistakes — yes, sometimes serious ones. But I never made them with bad intentions; I always made them with good intentions. My conscience is clear about my own life. Hmm… listen, I think I could give myself fifty percent. Yes, fifty percent would be all right.
Fallaci also prefaces with a humorous anecdote from the first day, excluded from the final transcript, resulting from her offering birthday greetings:
Deng: My birthday? Is it my birthday tomorrow?
Fallaci: Yes, I read it in your biography.
Deng: Humph! If you say so… I don’t know. I never know when my birthday is, and, even if it is, it’s hardly something to be congratulated about. It means I’m turning sixty-six. And sixty-six means decay.
Fallaci: My father is sixty-six, Mr. Deng, and if I tell my father that this means decay, I think he’ll clock me.
Deng: As well he should! You certainly shouldn’t be saying such things to your father.
[2] Among other things, Chen Yun (b. 1905-1995) was known for coining the term “birdcage economy” in relation to the policy of Reform and Opening Up: “The cage is the plan, and it may be large or small. But within the cage the bird is free to fly as he wishes.” — R. D.